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NOTES
made a right under federal law nor a violation of it. ' '2o The re-
sult of these two decisions is to define an area which is outside
the jurisdiction of the NLRB, thus tracing the reverse side of
the Garner doctrine. 21 Assuming that the decision in the instant
case is correct, employers must seek relief from "harassing
tactics" either by discharging employees or by proceeding under
state statutes. The courts may also have the problem of de-
termining what types of economic pressure by employers are
beyond the pale of the employer's duty to bargain in good faith
under section 8 (a) (5).22
John S. White, Jr.
LEGAL PROFESSION - DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS - PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Defendant attorney appeared before a United States Senate
subcommittee, but refused to answer questions relating to his
past and present membership in the Communist Party. His re-
fusal to answer was based on the protection against self-incrimi-
nation in the first and fifth amendments of the Federal Con-
stitution and sections 12 and 13 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Constitution of Florida. Subsequently, the Florida State
Attorney filed a motion to disbar defendant for misconduct and
unprofessional acts, alleging that defendant was a member of
the Communist Party and that he had refused to answer ques-
tions regarding his membership. It was also contended that
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination is evidence of
misconduct by an attorney. During the trial of the case de-
fendant was again questioned as to his communist affiliations.
He refused to answer, again claiming the privilege against self-
incrimination of the Federal and State Constitutions. The trial
court entered an order of disbarment and defendant appealed.
The Florida Supreme Court held, reversed.' "There may be cir-
cumstances under which claiming the privilege against self-
incrimination would be cause for discipline or even disbarment,
20. Id at 265.
21. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, Local 776, 346 U.S. 48.5 (1953). In
that case, it was held that state courts may not enjoin union picketing for the
purpose of coercing employers to compel their employees to join a union, because
such conduct was regulated by section 8(b) of the act.
22. Section 8(a) provides: "lt shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer .. . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
1. Jones, J., dissenting.
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but they should be demonstrated by adequate proof." Defendant
was not accorded due process since an inference of membership
in the Communist Party cannot be drawn from his invocation
of the privilege and refusal to answer. Sheiner v. Florida, 82
So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution cannot be invoked
in state proceedings, and is not an essential of due process se-
cured by the fourteenth amendment.2 However, in those states
that have granted a privilege against self-incrimination, due
process does require that no inference of guilt be drawn from
the invocation of the privilege.3 In cases involving the dismissal
of policemen and teachers, as well as the disbarment of lawyers,
the courts have been faced with the problem of whether or not
an inference from the invocation of the privilege should be drawn
in order to justify dismissal from employment. 4 However, in
the policemen and teacher cases, the courts do not discuss the
issue of dismissal in terms of drawing an inference from the
invocation of the privilege, but speak rather in terms of "public
administration" and of the authority of an employer to impose
any condition he desires on employment. Thus it has been con-
sistently held that police officers may be dismissed for invoking
2. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908).
3. In Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 55 (1947), 'Mr. Justice Reed stated
in the majority opinion: "It is, of course, logically possible that while an accused
might be required, under appropriate penalties, to submit himself as a witness
without a violation of due process, comment by judge or jury on inferences to be
drawn from his failure to testify, in jurisdictions where an accused's privilege
against self-incrimination is protected, might deny due process." Burdick v. United
States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915) ; United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212
F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1954), where it is stated: "But whatever the underlying
motivation, an invocation of the Fifth Amendment is no ground at all for an
inference of guilt . . . . [T]he privilege created by the amendment is for the inno-
cent as well as the guilty and no inference can be drawn against the person claim-
ing it that he fears that he is 'engaged in doing something forbidden by federal
law.' "
4. See Noonan, Inferences from the Invocation of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 41 VA. L. REv. 311 (.1955), where the author notes that the priv-
ilege was historically granted not only to impede inquisition, but to impede inqui-
sition in those cases where religious and political beliefs are an important element.
Likewise, "where matters of a man's belief or opinions or political views are essen-
tial elements in the charge, it may be most difficult to get evidence from sources
other than the suspected or accused person himself. Hence, the significance of
the privilege over the years has perhaps been greatest in connection with resistance
to prosecution for such offenses as heresy or political crimes. In these areas the
privilege against self-incrimination has been a protection for freedom of thought
and a hindrance to any government which might wish to prosecute for thoughts
and opinions alone." GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 8 (1955).
[Vol. XVI
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the privilege against self-incrimination. 5 This rule is predicated
upon the close relationship between the duty owed by police
officers to expose crime and the duty to expose their own
criminal conduct." The courts have also upheld the dismissal
of teachers who plead the privilege when questioned as to sub-
versive affiliations. The teacher has a constitutional right to
refuse to incriminate himself, but has no constitutional right
to remain a teacher when found to be unfit by school au-
thorities.7 But cases involving an attempt to disbar an attorney
5. An example of the penalty imposed upon public officials for refusing to
testify is LA. R.S. 33:2426 (1950), which provides: "If an officer or employee
in the city service or any officer or employee of the state or political subdivision
of the state wilfully refuses or fails to appear before any court or judge, or any
legislative committee, or any officer, board, or body authorized to conduct any
hearing or inquiry, or if the employee or officer having appeared, refuses to tes-
tify or answer any question relating to the affairs or government of the city or
the conduct of any city officer or employee on the ground that his testimony or
answers would tend to incriminate him, or refuses to waive immunity from prosecu-
tion on account of any matter about which he is asked to testify at any such
hearing or inquiry, he shall forfeit his position and shall not be eligible for ap-
pointment to any position in the classified service of the city for a period of two
years."
6. "The petitioner [a policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk poli-
tics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employ-
ments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional
rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract.
The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition
upon holding offices within its control." Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. City of
New Bedford, 1.55 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). See also Pfitzinger v.
United States Civil Service Commission, 96 F. Supp. 1 (D.C.N.J. 1951) (privilege
against self-incrimination cannot be invoked to protect one from removal from
office under an act which forbids political activity) ; Christal v. Police Commission
of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939) (grand jury investi-
gation to determine if officers had been guilty of criminal activities in connection
with their duties as police officers) ; Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d
728 (1949) (commission could properly discharge city police officers in classified
service for refusal to execute waiver of immunity from criminal prosecution which
might arise out of testimony by officers before grand jury) ; Scholl v. Bell, 125
Ky. 750, 102 S.W. 248 (1907) ; Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d
972 (1940) (officers refused to execute waiver of immunity).
. 7. In Dariman v. Board of Education of City of New York, 306 N.Y. 532,
119 N.E.2d 373 (1954), the court emphasized that no inference of membership
in the Communist Party may be drawn from the assertion of one's privilege against
self-incrimination, but nevertheless allowed the teacher to be fired for refusing to
answer. The court talked in terms of an employer-employee relationship in allowing
the dismissal. Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, 331 Mass. 771, 120 N.E.2d
772 (1954), involved the dismissal of a teacher who had refused to answer ques-
tions concerning communist activities. The court held: "Refusal to testify does
not prove guilt and no inference of guilt can be drawn from it in a criminal case.
But the question here is not one of guilt or innocence. It is a question of adminis-
tration by a public board in the public interest." (Emphasis added.) In Board of
Education of Los Angeles v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App.2d 100, 270 P.2d 84 (1954),
the court cited with approval McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,
29 N.E. 517 (1892), involving the dismissal of police officers. The United States
Supreme Court, in Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U.S.
485, 492 (1952), clearly stated: "It is equally clear that they [the teachers] have
no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms. They may
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for exercising his privilege against self-incrimination are more
difficult of solution. Generally, an attorney cannot be disbarred
for exercising the privilege.8 Some courts restrict the applica-
tion of this general rule to cases where the privilege is exercised
in good faith.9 However, one jurisdiction has refused to admit
an attorney to the bar because he invoked the privilege before
a committee inquiring into his fitness.10 These cases involving
attempts to disbar an attorney recognize the rule that no infer-
ence of guilt can be drawn from the invocation of the privilege.
In the instant case three issues were presented to the court:
Is membership in a subversive organization sufficient to justify
disbarment for "professional misconduct"? Can membership in
such a subversive organization be inferred from defendant's re-
work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper
authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are
at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere."
8. In re Dorsey, 8 Ala. (7 Porter) 293 (1938) ; Jw parte Marshall, 165 Miss.
523, 147 So. 791 (1933) ; In re Kaffenburgh, 188 N.Y. 49, 80 N.E. 570 (1907) ;
contra, In re Rouse, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917), where the court held that
where the witness is an attorney, evidence obtained under a grant of immunity may
be used in a subsequent disbarment action, as such an action is civil in nature
rather than criminal and involves no penalty. Justice Cardoza stated: "Member-
ship in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A fair private and pro-
fessional character is one of them. Compliance with that condition is essential at
the moment of admission. . . . To refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offenses. The examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness. To strike the unworthy
lawyer from the roll is not to add to the pains and penalties of crime." Id. at 84.
9. Matter of Ellis, 258 App. Div. 558, 17 N.Y.S.2d 800 (2d Dep't 1940) ; In re
Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940) ; Matter of Levy and Becker, 225 N.Y.
223, 174 N.E. 461 (1913) ; People ex ret. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 38 N.E.
303 (1894) ; Notes, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 708 (1940), 25 CORN. L.Q. 420 (1940),
53 HARv. L. REv. 871 (1940).
10. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill.2d 471, 479, 121 N.E.2d 826, 831 (1954) : "While
technically not a government employee, a lawyer meets on common ground with
one so employed, in that loyalty to the constitution is an inalienable condition to
their service. In either case, Communist Party membership or communist activity
is totally incompatible with such loyalty.
"It is our opinion, therefore, that a member of the Communist Party may,
because of such membership, be unable to truthfully and in good conscience to take
the oath required as a condition for admission to practice, and we hold that it is
relevant to inquire of an applicant as to his membership in that party. A nega-
tive answer to the question, if accepted as true, would end the inquiry on the
point. If the truthfulness of a negative answer were doubted, further questions
and information to test the veracity of the applicant would be proper. If an af-
firmative answer were received, further inquiry into the applicant's innocence or
knowledge as to the subversive nature of the organization would be relevant. Under
any hypothesis, therefore, questions as to membership in the Communist Party
or known subversive 'front' organizations were relevant to the inquiry into peti-
tioner's fitness for admission to the bar. His refusal to answer has prevented the
committee from inquiring fully into his general fitness and good citizenship and
justifies their refusal to issue a certificate." The court further stated that the
attorney must be deemed to have agreed to waive his constitutional right of free
speech against relevant inquiry, relying on the cases involving suspension of public
employees cited in note 6 aupra. See also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
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fusal to answer for fear of self-incrimination? Is defendant
guilty of "professional misconduct" for invoking his constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination? The first question
was answered in the affirmative, the court stating that present
membership in a subversive organization would definitely be
grounds for disbarment. However, the court gave no indication
as to the effect of past membership on an attorney's right to
practice law. The second question was answered in the negative.
The court considered it a violation of due process for the trial
court to have inferred membership in a subversive organization
from the mere refusal of defendant to answer questions con-
cerning his conduct. In drawing an inference from some estab-
lished fact, due process requires that there be some reasonable
relationship between the fact proved and the fact presumed or
inferred.1' In the instant case, the only fact proved was that
defendant had refused to answer questions concerning his mem-
bership in subversive organizations. The court concluded, how-
ever, that membership cannot be reasonably inferred from this
fact, as defendant may have invoked the privilege for reasons
unrelated to membership. 12 If the state wished to disbar the de-
fendant, the burden rested upon the state to prove membership
in a subversive organization. This burden was not satisfied by
mere proof of the exercise of the privilege. The third question
is not expressly answered, but the court implies that invocation
of the privilege by an attorney is not sufficient to constitute
misconduct. However, the dissenting opinion takes issue on this
question and argues that there is no absolute or inalienable right
to practice law. This is so because the practice of law is a priv-
ilege granted by the state and may be regulated in the public
interest, even to the extent of requiring an attorney to forego
exercising his constitutional privilege. 18 This argument of the
dissenting judge is met in the majority opinion only to the
extent of saying that due process requires proof before an at-
torney can be disbarred. Evidence of the invocation of the priv-
ilege is insufficient proof. 4
11. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) ; Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
12. For an interesting discussion of this situation, see GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY 14 (1955).
13. In connection with the language used by the dissent, it should be noted that
once the practice of law is classed as a privilege, as contrasted to a right, there is
no longer the guarantee of constitutional protection. See Bailey v. Richardson, 341
U.S. 918 (1951).
14. In a concurring opinion by Justice Floyd, it is pointed out that democracy
must be sold on its merits, and not on the demerits of communism. Therefore,
1956]
582 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI
The writer suggests that the court correctly distinguished
the instant case from the cases involving dismissal of public
employees. In the interest of public safety and welfare some
inquiry must be made into the character of the public employee.
If the employee does not cooperate in this examination of his
character, then he has not qualified himself as a public servant.
However, the status of the attorney is not "public employment"
but is a "public trust." If such status is to be denied the attorney
for refusing to disclose his subversive activities, this denial
should come from the client and not from the public authority.
It is an entirely different matter, however, when membership
in a subversive organization is proved. In that case the attorney
is no longer qualified to hold this "public trust."
Jerry G. Jones
PROPERTY - CEMETERIES - DEDICATION - PRESCRIPTION
In 1895 a tract of land was sold to one of defendant's authors
in title subject to a reservation of a portion of the land as a
public graveyard. This reservation was included in every subse-
quent act of sale. No formal acceptance was made or other
action taken by the governing authorities, but since 1895 the
land has been used by the general public as a cemetery. Plain-
tiffs, relatives of deceased persons interred in the cemetery,1
brought an action to establish the boundary between the ceme-
tery and defendant's land, alleging ,that defendant had appro-
priated a portion of the cemetery property. Defendant pleaded
the acquisitive prescription of thirty years, which was sustained
by the trial court. On appeal, held, reversed. The reservation in
the original act of sale, combined with the public use of the
cemetery for more than half a century, constituted an effec-
tive dedication of the land to public use. Land dedicated for use
conviction should be by an American process, that is, charge, try, prove, and
convict on the basis of time-honored tradition of democratic precepts. The state
has failed to establish a "preponderance of evidence" which would justify disbar-
ment. 82 So.2d 657, 667 (Fla. 1952).
1. Defendant contested the plaintiffs' right to sue, but the court, relying on
Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940), in which
the same problem was presented, found that plaintiffs' personal interest in pre-
serving the cemetery as a burial place for members of their family and in being
buried alongside their departed relatives gives them standing to sue. For earlier
cases granting citizens the right to sue where "public things" were involved, see
Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann. 630 (1877); Morgan v. Lombard, 26 La. Ann.
462 (1874) ; Burthe v. Fortier, 15 La. Ann. 9 (1860) ; Allard v. Lobau, 2 Mart.
(N.S.) 317 (1824).
